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Information and Communication Technologies in Peacebuilding: 
Implications, Opportunities and Challenges 
Ioannis Tellidis and Stefanie Kappler  
 
Abstract 
Despite the volume of research exploring the use of Information and Communication 
Technologies (ICTs) for destructive purposes (terrorism, crime, war propaganda) on the one 
hand, and Development (ICT4D) on the other hand, very little has been said about the role 
that traditional, and especially new social media, can play for the transformation and 
prevention of conflicts. This paper recognises ICTs as a tool, thus accepting their multi-level 
and multi-dimensional potential in the transformation as well as the intransigence and 
promotion of conflict. The paper seeks to explore a) whether ICTs can empower marginalised 
actors to transcend the peacebuilding and statebuilding processes, and lead to a more locally-
owned, more representative transformation of the conflict; b) whether ICTs can foster more 
hybrid forms of peace; c) whether they can be co-opted as a platform by donors to promote 
their agendas and impede resistance. 
 
Keywords: information, communication, technology, peacebuilding, empowerment 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Information and communication technologies (ICTs) have long been viewed as 
separate from the study of peace and conflict. Against this background and from a critical 
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peacebuilding perspective, this article examines the role that ICTs can play in the promotion 
of peace and the ways in which it may facilitate local and international actors to complement 
each other’s practices in their efforts to build peace. To date, there is a substantial literature 
that is being built on the role that ICTs can play for destructive purposes (terrorism, 
radicalisation, criminality) as well as a rather strong body of policy-relevant literature and 
web presence on the ways in which ICTs can be used in contexts of humanitarian relief 
(HICT) and mid-term development (ICT4D) (see International Federation of the Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Societies, 2002, 2005; Unwin, 2009). Although peacebuilding may often 
incorporate humanitarian and development dimensions, an examination of ICTs with regards 
to these is concerned correspondingly with improvements in emergency response (Vinck 
2013), and the improvement of socioeconomic conditions for local communities in 
developing and/or underdeveloped countries (Heeks 2009). Yet, there is a significant lack of 
research, particularly in the field of Peace and Conflict Studies, of the role of ICTs towards 
inclusive, post-conflict peacebuilding and statebuilding. That is not only the facilitation of 
information between actors (as in the case of HICT and ICT4D) but a contribution towards 
the transformation of conflict issues, contexts, structures and actors. On the other hand, most 
research that examines the use of ICTs in a context of conflict has revolved around crisis 
prevention and early warning systems (Stauffacher et al, 2011; Learning and Meier, 2009), or 
around issues of democratisation (Danitz and Strobel, 1999; Akoh and Ahiabenu, 2012; 
CIPESA, 2012). In particular, there seems to be no study that examines the role of ICTs in 
‘peace formation’ – the emergence of local, peaceful forms of subaltern power seeking non-
violent, peaceful change, mitigating the exclusivity of agency presented (and deployed) by 
international and national actors (Richmond, 2013).  
Our point of departure is the critique that liberal peacebuilding has been an imposition 
onto local populations affected by conflict, rather than a negotiated synergy between 
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international, national and local actors (Lederach, 1997; Bleiker, 2000; Duffield, 2001; Clark, 
2001; Paris, 2004; Richmond, 2007 and 2012; Jabri, 2007; Pugh et al, 2008; Newman et al, 
2010; Mac Ginty, 2011, Kappler, 2011). It must be noted here that it is not our intention to 
create and maintain an artificial divide between ‘good locals’ and ‘bad internationals’, as it is 
usually implied in the literature of hybrid peacebuilding. As shown elsewhere, there are many 
dilemmas surrounding the hybrid peace (Richmond 2015) and the distinctions between 
subject and object are not entirely clear in hybrid frameworks of peacebuilding (Mac Ginty 
2011: 113). What is more, the relationship between the ‘local’ and the ‘international’ is as 
much co-constitutive as it is competitive (Hameiri 2011; Sending 2011). The article’s 
argument consists of both sets of critiques – that is, the critique that focuses on the limits of 
liberal peacebuilding and the latter’s imposition (rather than negotiated implementation), as 
well as the critique that exposes the limits of hybrid peacebuilding frameworks. This, in turn, 
helps guide our analysis on whether (and how) ICTs can be the tool whereby hybrid 
frameworks of peace avoid the reproduction of liberal peace’s inclusion and exclusion logics 
(Nadarajah and Rampton 2015), thus bridging the distance between local/everyday and 
international needs, demands and expectations (see Hoffmann, 2014; Bratic, 2008). 
The article borrows Hamelink’s definition of ICTs, who defines them as ‘all those 
technologies that enable the handling of information and facilitate different forms of 
communication among human actors, between human beings and electronic systems, and 
among electronic systems’ (Hamelink, 1997: 3). This points to a departure from 
traditional/broadcast media, whereby communication was predominantly one-way and often 
susceptible to power controls, such as government censorship (Weidman 2015). In contrast, 
new social media and mobile technologies facilitate a two-way communication which 
enhances access to information, increases the opportunities to engage in public speech and 
raises the possibilities of collective action (Shirky 2011).  
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The article’s novelty lies not only in the lack of research that addresses the role of 
ICTs in peacebuilding processes, but also on the significance of the participatory elements 
offered by ICTs in such processes. We argue that socio-technical approaches to peace should 
conceptualise ICTs as a tool that can serve inclusionary frameworks of post-conflict co-
existence, as much as it can be used to propagate conflict and cement divisions (ethnic, 
political, social or other). The article shows that a conceptualisation of ICTs as a tool points 
to three distinct scenarios, that is, the hegemonic use of ICTs, their marginalisation or, 
alternatively, their use as a representative, participatory tool. As we show, even when the 
third scenario prevails, local power imbalances may be perpetuated or reinforced, at the 
expense of marginalised actors. This implies that for every identified positive role that ICTs 
can play, there are corresponding risks that may spoil or stall peacebuilding efforts, or indeed 
reinforce or generate new power structures that render said efforts exclusionary. This is 
significant because similar risks have also manifested in traditional peacebuilding 
frameworks, thus highlighting the fact that ICTs should not be viewed as the panacea for 
peacebuilding’s maladies.  
The following section functions as an empirical background of the use of ICTs in 
regions where conflict has manifested. This is then followed by a discussion of the 
conceptual variations of power with regards to ICTs and their role in producing meaning and 
action. The final section analyses the role of the ICTs in post-conflict peacebuilding and the 
conditions that limit their use, and presents the article’s framework that conceptualises the 
potential and the risks for ICTs in the context of peacebuilding. Without claiming to be 
comprehensive or representative, this article aims to highlight the dynamics of power 
inherent in peacebuilding through ICTs. 
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ICTs in conflict: An empirical background 
While the digital divide is indisputable, ICTs (and mobile technologies specifically) have an 
incredibly fast penetration of societies that are currently considered ‘developing’ (BBC 
News, 2011). As such, they may provide the potential for empowerment by opening up 
spaces for participation and for local ownership of conflict transformation and peace 
formation. Yet development, peacebuilding and statebuilding policies have traditionally been 
administered by western actors and, despite their advocacy of inclusive democracy and 
human rights, their application has been unequal (Richmond 2009; Beckfield, 2003: 402).  
One must also bear in mind that not all post-conflict regions have the capacity to 
benefit from ICTs – due to a number of obstacles, such as lack of widespread use, often 
combined with technological illiteracy, and lack of electricity.
1
 This tends to be associated 
with the ‘digital divide’, which has reinforced global inequalities in terms of who accesses 
which technologies and who is excluded from cross-societal and cross-cultural discourses 
(Warschauer, 2003). This claim, however, points to the rarity with which  the international 
community of donor states and organisations (with the exception of UNDP and USAID) has 
promoted the initiatives of local civil society organisations (CSOs) that have established ICT 
platforms which facilitate an agenda of peace and/or conflict transformation (Hoffmann, 
2014).  
Somewhat speculatively, such caution may be attributed to two factors: the diversity 
of both ICTs, the settings in which they are used, and the risk that said use may in fact 
increase, rather than decrease, violence. In the cases of Kenya and Kyrgyzstan, text 
messaging systems were implemented in anticipation to the outbreak of political violence 
ahead of and during elections. In Bosnia-Herzegovina and Cyprus, on the other hand, ICT-
based efforts for collective action aiming at the transformation of conflict attitudes, 
behaviours and issues have rested mainly on the use of Facebook and Twitter as well as 
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similar networks and associated online offers launched by diverse civil society initiatives 
(www.mreza-mira.net; www.foyacyprus.com). Yet, for every ‘benign’ use of these media, 
there is a corresponding opposite that seeks to exacerbate conflict, reinforce conflict 
dynamics and/or cement power that was generated as a result of the conflict itself. As it has 
been shown elsewhere, social media (Warren 2015) and mobile phones (Bailard 2015) may in 
fact generate substantial increases in collective violence, while ICTs often serve as tools of 
repression rather than liberation (Morozov 2011; Rød and Weidman 2015). Even when ICTs 
can empower individual or collective voices (such as female voices), there are no guarantees 
that these will influence government policies and actions (O’Neil and Cummings 2015). This 
diversity of media usage in (post-) conflict settings points to the risk of romanticising ICTs as 
the contemporary panacea to conflict transformation obstacles.  
To this end, the paper recognises that ICTs can be a tool both for the transformation 
as well as the intransigence and promotion of conflict, and seeks to investigate their multi-
level and multi-dimensional potential. ICTs are generally recognised to be useful for the 
management of crises and conflict (Learning and Meier 2009), as well as for their monitoring 
and prevention (Stauffacher et al. 2005; Mancini 2013; Mancini and O’Reilly 2013) as the 
aforementioned cases of Kenya and Kyrgyzstan indicate. This implies and involves improved 
communication that increases transparency and trust-building, which in turn may facilitate 
negotiations by building pressure from the bottom-up, as became evident in Bosnia’s ‘baby-
lution’. The failure of Bosnia’s politicians to fix a lapse in the law that prevented newborns 
from being given an identity number (and, by extension, travel papers and healthcare), 
resulted in the death of a newborn that needed surgery abroad (Gocmanac, 2013). This led to 
demonstrations in front of the parliament in Sarajevo and across all ethnic divides for the first 
time since the end of the war. The public outcry this provoked, not least through the use of 
social media yet again reflects the potential that particularly social media, such as Facebook 
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or Twitter, may have impacting upon political discourses. This protest must indeed be read in 
the context of post-conflict dynamics, in that it cast light on dynamics of ethnic division on 
the one hand, but at the same time on the possibility of overcoming such divides through the 
use of social media, which seemed key in the mobilisation of the public to go out on the 
streets and protest. Armakolas and Maksimovic (2013: 10) highlight the role of the new 
media in generating a feeling of solidarity across the country, albeit to a larger extent in the 
Federation than in Republika Srpska. At the same time, those media seemed unable to sustain 
the momentum generated, resulting in disappointment on the part of the population who had 
hoped to kick-start a longer-term process of protest and resistance. 
Understanding the ontological functionality of ICTs as a tool that can serve either end 
of the spectrum leads to the observation that their empowerment potential is not inherent but 
instead depends on the dynamics of power as they are expressed in (and during) the politics 
of peacebuilding. ICTs may be seen to reinforce or generate power biases independently of 
the peacebuilding activities, mainly related to the identity and the socio-economic situation of 
its users (in the case of computer-based social media, said users tend to be wealthy, relatively 
young, urban, computer-literate males
2
). In addition, we need to differentiate even further: as 
early as 2003 and researching the American context, Rice and Katz (2003) pointed out that 
media usage is contingent on a variety of social factors, such as education and income. This is 
even more true in a global context, where different technologies prevail in different countries, 
regions and localities.
3
 Having said that, such distinction between mobile phoneand computer 
use may no longer be easily discernible considering the increasing capabilities of mobile 
phones. Finally, there is also an ethical dimension of the paradox whereby technology is used 
for the promotion of peace, yet the metals necessary for the manufacturing of its core 
components are often sourced from regions where conflict, impoverishment and 
underdevelopment are not only prevalent, but also exacerbated by their extraction.
4
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These observations help raise the following questions: a) Can ICTs enable 
marginalised actors to transcend the peacebuilding and statebuilding politics played out 
between national and international actors, and lead to a more locally-owned, more 
representative transformation of the conflict? b) Can ICTs promote more hybrid 
manifestations of peace, reflecting both the diversity of local needs and interests as well as 
international agendas? c) Or can they be co-opted as a platform by donors to promote their 
agendas and impede resistance?  
The following section discusses the conceptual variations of power with regards to 
ICTs in post-conflict peacebuilding settings, and looks at their potential in the production of 
meaning and action.  
 
Whose power? What Power? 
 
ICTs are often viewed as a tool through which the grassroots levels of society can be 
empowered (Chapman and Slaymaker, 2002). The concept of ‘empowerment’ entails various 
conceptualisations of power. As identified by Rowlands (1997: 13), these are: ‘power over’, 
‘power to’, ‘power with’ and ‘power within’. The first of these is Robert Dahl’s definition, 
which has become prevalent in International Relations and associated with dominance (“A 
has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise 
do”) (Dahl, 1957: 202-3). Contrary to this ‘zero-sum’ understanding, the latter three 
conceptualisations identified by Rowlands are better understood as processes, whereby a 
social group is a) empowered to implement action without seeking to dominate another 
group; b) empowered along with other social groups, thus leading to the sharing of power; 
and, c) empowered within, through self-acceptance and self-respect, which extend to 
respecting and accepting others as equals. 
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This discussion is highly relevant when examining the role of ICTs in post-conflict 
peacebuilding because it helps unearth the current understandings and practices of the 
international community (consisting of states as well as governmental and non-governmental 
organisations) vis-à-vis marginalised, unrepresented communities in whose name ‘peace’ is 
being built. The tendency of the international community to keep imposing its liberal and 
neo-liberal values and ideals (leading invariably to Mac Ginty’s often-quoted IKEA 
analogy
5), manifests a ‘power over’ the local populations that are quite often perceived as 
backward, or even hostile to the ‘well-intentioned’ Western savants (Richmond, 2011).  
Technology, however, is used by humans according to their realities – it is their use of 
it that ascribes meaning and importance to it (Orlikowski, 2000) – and that empowerment 
cannot be bestowed in the first place without hybrid interaction with the subjects – it must be 
claimed first and then facilitated. Thus, any advancement in technology may be futile unless 
the current understanding(s) of the internationals’ power over locals is transformed into the 
internationals’ power to allow locals to own, manage and direct peace efforts. Examples from 
Kenya’s preventive violence network (Jorgic, 2013), Uganda’s election monitoring 
(Hellström and Karefelt, 2012), Sudan’s low tech adaptations for community 
communications (Puig Larrauri, 2013a), Cyprus’ civil society empowerment (UNDP, 2008) 
and elsewhere prove that ICTs can be enablers for peace, not because they directly empower 
the local over the national and international, or the marginalised over the elites, but because 
they can be used for the mobilisation of grassroots actors, which may affect peacebuilding’s 
balances of power. This is important given that ICTs can act as mediators – that is, according 
to Latour (2007: 39), to serve as a medium or actor that distorts, changes and modifies the 
meaning of the elements it carries. In that respect, the mediator’s ‘input is never a good 
predictor of their output’ (Latour, 2007: 39). Framed as such, it becomes evident that ICTs 
hold the potential (although not necessarily, nor always, deploying it) to decentralise and re-
 10 
 
circulate the input of liberal peacebuilding (hegemonic power, or tendencies towards) with a 
different output (mobilisation towards more inclusionary peace). The premise on which this 
rests, as Puig Larrauri (2013b) puts it, is the requirement of ‘letting go of control, giving in to 
the fact that we don’t know exactly how people will make use of information and 
communication tools’. This is the very point where empowerment lies – although not without 
its risks, including the promotion of division and hate. 
 
 
The role of ICTs in post-conflict peacebuilding 
 
  
The factors of information and communication have been prevalent in development studies 
through ICT4D and have only very recently been substantially expanded to cover conflict 
prevention research. Even then, however, most studies veer off towards the alleviation of 
suffering and protection from natural disasters – whether it be earthquakes, droughts or fires . 
Early-warning humanitarian platforms such as the Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs’ (OCHA) ReliefWeb and Integrated Regional Information Network 
(IRIN), and AlertNet are indicative of this. Their activities are restricted either to information 
dissemination or the enhancement of existing practices and activities regarding humanitarian 
issues. The reasons for lack of a more holistic approach are twofold. First, ‘the humanitarian 
community is woefully unprepared to deal with this tidal wave of user-generated crisis 
information’ (Meier, 2013). Second, as it has been shown elsewhere (Kingston and Stam, 
2013), even human rights NGOs are far less likely to capitalise on the ICTs’ ‘meta-power’ – 
their ability to foster interactions that change the identity of actors and their meanings of 
issues (Singh, 2013) – which is essential in allowing both post-conflict peacebuilding as well 
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as prevention. However, it must be noted that prevention is problematic because of 
sovereignty, lack of political will and constraints of international diplomacy (Stauffacher et 
al, 2005: 18). As a result, the onus for prevention and social reconciliation falls on civil 
society initiatives – if and where one exists – without much support. This is what the UN 
refers to as ‘people-centred systems’ (United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, 
2006) indirectly recognising the often tragic gap(s) between early warning indicators and 
executive decisions to alleviate, prevent and/or protect.  
 Possible ways of transforming conflict dynamics and enhancing post-conflict 
peacebuilding through ICTs can be found in the assembly of joint narratives of suffering 
(Mannergren Selimovic, 2013; Bratic and Schirch, 2007: 22), or the commonality of 
problems affecting everyday life, as in Israel’s and Palestine’s case of the Parents Circle 
Families Forum (www.theparentscircle.com) (Castelnuovo, 2013). Today Facebook and 
Twitter can be far more catalytic for said initiatives, since ‘the power of citizen media lies in 
its grassroots, bottom-up authenticity and spontaneity’ (Hilmerfab and Chabalowski, 2008). 
Turkey’s ‘Gezi park protests’ in the early summer of 2013 are indicative of that 
empowerment, but even more indicative is the Turkish government’s decision to form a 
6,000-member social media team to promote the ruling party’s perspective, after months of 
trying to discredit andcontrol Facebook and Twitter (Albayrak and Parkinson, 2013). Along 
those lines, the use of new media has also opened up possibilities of dealing with conflict in 
non-conventional ways. Strategies, such as digital storytelling (Burgess, 2006), the 
facilitation of grassroots participation and network building (Hattotuwa, 2004: 51) can indeed 
be said to open up new channels of participation for previously excluded actors, while at the 
same time not serving as a panacea against exclusion and discrimination due to limitations in 
accessibility as well as inherent power dynamics, as outlined above.  
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 Moreover, the now decade-old critique that peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts 
are not sufficiently locally-focused obtains renewed and reinforced significance when 
examined through the prism of the role of ICTs. This is because  
 
‘ICT interventions can have more impact when used for peacebuilding after a 
ceasefire or peace agreement, when the dynamics on the ground are more receptive on 
the need for sharing information, collaborating, appropriating technology and 
development mechanisms (both physical and virtual) for communities and peoples to 
deal with conflict creatively and non-violently’ (Hattotuwa, 2004: 51).  
 
The reason for this heightened impact is the change in discourse and narratives, that is, from 
the need to be at war to the need to be at peace. As it has been shown elsewhere, the 
formation of this new narrative is easier in ‘decentralized contexts than authoritative ones 
because they allow multiple actors to participate at levels and intensity unimaginable before’ 
(Singh, 2013). The failure of the international network of peacebuilding actors (states and 
organisations) to take full advantage of the potential of ICTs can be seen as linked to the 
former’s top-down modus operandi, its inequality (Beckfield, 2003: 402) and its self-
perception of expertise despite the fact that 50% or more of the interventions undertaken have 
seen a reversion to conflict within five years (Barnett et al, 2007). Despite the correlation 
between protracted conflicts and the presence within those of a civil society with very little 
access to social media (Hussain and Howard, 2013), the international community’s concern 
with peace has often marginalised social media as one of a number of potentially 
participatory peacebuilding tools. This is not least the case because the construction of 
peacebuilding legitimacy has only become a concern in recent years (Roberts, 2013).  
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So far the priority of numerous governments and international agencies regarding the 
promotion of ICTs in post-conflict peacebuilding is to see them as promotional tools. There is 
of course a risk that if they try to promote pre-determined understandings of peace and are 
operated in a top-down manner, they will most likely fail, backfire or even become dangerous 
for the populations they attempt to support. One such example is the Haystack software used 
during Iran’s Green Revolution. The programme, whose purpose was to circumvent the 
regime’s censorship tactics, received the uncritical backing of the US government. Yet when 
it was examined more closely, it was revealed that it actually did the exact opposite of what it 
was supposed to due to a lack of technical skills on the part of those examining and 
controlling the modus operandi of the programme (Shirky, 2011). 
It is also of outmost importance to note at this point that one must guard against the 
fact that ICTs are the panacea of the maladies of peacebuilding (and to a certain extent, 
statebuilding). Instead, the nature of peacebuilding through ICTs as well as the associated 
strategies, interests and infrastructures remain to be questioned and analysed in depth. Their 
tool-like ontology poses a number of problems that includes their use for devious objectives, 
spoilers and the promotion of hidden agendas as the aforementioned example in Iran made 
evident. Moreover, the need for interpretation and contextualisation (Mancini and O’Reilly, 
2013), as well as the degree of representativeness of the data generated, is still present and 
cannot (yet) be done automatically but, rather, relies on human agency and initiative. The 
data generated through the use of newer technologies indeed bear a strong risk of exclusion: 
social media are not used by all classes and generations alike, while information databases 
and collection services tend to be run and designed by expert-organisations. The “Everyday 
Peace Indicators Project”, based at George Mason University 
(http://everydaypeaceindicators.org/) is just one example of where the use of mobile phones 
reflects the possibility to reach out to communities which had thus far been excluded from the 
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design of peace processes. On the other hand, this and related projects still face factors of 
exclusion, such as the need to find local partners, constrained political environments and so 
forth.  
Against this background, we propose the following approach to conceptualising the 
potential role of ICTs in peacebuilding: 
 
 Marginalisation Hegemony Empowerment 
Role of ICTs Ignored and denied 
funding/attention; 
‘non-virtual 
peacebuilding’ 
Denying access; 
rhetorical tool; 
policy legitimation 
Active support 
through donors and 
agencies; ICTs 
producing policy-
input 
Risks Neglecting the 
potential of ICTs to 
reach out to broader 
audiences 
Reinforcement of 
top-down dynamics 
Reinforcing local 
power imbalances 
and systems of 
exclusion 
 
Marginalisation: ICTs as an under-explored tool 
 
Despite an emerging assumption that ICTs and social media will be crucial tools in 
international peacebuilding activities (confidential source 2013), peacebuilders’ interest in 
ICTs is relatively recent. In some cases, this may be because of a lack of knowledge in terms 
of how to use ICTs for peace-related purposes. This does not mean that ICTs are not used at 
all, but instead that they are used in a rather static and one-way form. For example, in Cyprus 
actors such as the UNDP are using Facebook, Twitter and YouTube to disseminate their 
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activities. For the European Union (EU), the use of diverse media in Cyprus is part of its 
strategy of ‘Going Local’ and represents an attempt to break through the perceived distance 
between the grassroots and the institution (European Commission 2013). A political analyst 
of the Commission’s Delegation in Nicosia emphasised the active role that the EU now plays 
on networks such as Facebook, Twitter and Flickr, not only to promote the EU’s work, but 
also to advertise a number of events and activities (Cyprus Community Media Centre 2012). 
This clearly reflects a belief in the fact that social media will help bigger institutions 
(particularly when they tend to be perceived as distant from the grassroots) to get deeper 
access to societies and is most indicative of peacebuilding’s hybrid potential. Having said 
that, however, this access and connection entails the risk of being limited to a promotional 
use of social media instead of creating a two-way communication channel through which 
local populations’ voices are heard and implemented into the policies and strategies of 
peacebuilding actors. 
In other instances, ICTs are not explored to their full potential because of fear that 
their impact cannot be controlled, or because of a belief that these media are not suitable to 
bring about political change, or indeed because ‘proof’ of their impact is difficult to measure 
(Shoemaker and Stremlau, 2014: 184). In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a number of media 
outlets are reluctant to let political agendas take over too much. Besides the fact that ‘politics’ 
as such is considered as corrupt or a ‘dirty business’, there is also a risk of becoming (or 
being seen to become) co-opted by political agendas (Ajnadcic 2011). Moreover, the 
ambivalent character of ICTs means that intercommunal hostilities are often exacerbated in 
web portals and through social media, as in the case of both Bosnia (Voloder 2013) and 
Cyprus (Lamou 2012) – indicative of the perils inherent in Larauri’s suggestion to ‘let go of 
control’.    
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ICTs as a tool for hegemony 
 
Our framework reflects the ambivalent role that ICTs can play in peacebuilding practice. 
They can serve as a platform on which hegemony can be promoted and existing power 
imbalances be reinforced, shifting the balance towards powerful institutions if the latter are 
able to strategically use ICTs as legitimating tools. Post-conflict Sri Lanka is one such case 
where the state sought to impose a victor’s peace (Richmond and Tellidis, 2012) by 
controlling new social media, which the former President’s brother and Defence Secretary 
has branded ‘a threat to national security’ (The Republic Square, 2013a). Former President 
Rajapaksa himself recently referred to Facebook as a ‘disease’ (The Republic Square, 2013b), 
despite the fact that he himself has both a Facebook and a Twitter account. The imposition of 
the government’s victory narrative following the end of the war against LTTE includes 
support of nationalist extremist circles and their protection by the security forces 
(Groundviews, 2013), as well as the marginalisation of internationally promoted initiatives 
for reconciliation and reconstruction. Indicative of this is the management of the Lessons 
Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC – www.llrc.lk), set up with the objective of 
disseminating the Commission’s findings on humanitarian and development issues. Even 
though the Commission’s website is now defunct, finding its interim recommendations has 
always been impossible because the (government-allocated) websites were never updated to 
include them (Groundviews, 2012). Dissemination and distribution of LLRC’s findings was 
only made possible because of the efficiency of grassroots activists who copied and mirrored 
the documents on foreign websites. 
ICTs may be used as a hegemonic tool even in cases where there is no explicit 
strategy to impose a victor’s peace. In South Africa, for example, the emergence of township 
journalism through blogging in informal settlements (Siyakhona 2011) like Khayelitsha (near 
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Cape Town) is a striking example that reflects the extent to which internet access can help 
circumvent censorship in the public sphere and give a voice to marginalised communities on 
the one hand. On the other hand, it must be noted that while Khayelitsha benefits from access 
to electricity, other townships nearby (such as Malawi Town) have been denied electricity 
and are thus unable to participate in the use of ICT-based communication. Thus, besides the 
fulfilment of basic human needs, political voice is also denied to certain groups and 
communities. This may as well represent a political strategy of keeping contestation and 
deviance under control. The marginalisation of ICTs in broader society is in this case not only 
a result of ‘not-knowing’ or a lack of technical skills, but equally a deliberate (hegemonic) 
strategy of keeping certain populations at bay and under control by denying them a platform 
of empowerment. 
 
ICTs as a tool of hybrid peacebuilding 
 
A third conceptualisation of ICTs is that of empowerment. The UNDP has increasingly been 
accepting ICTs as catalytic enablers both for e-governance (UNDP 2013) as well as for the 
promotion of peace and development. To that effect, it is now seeking to exploit the potential 
of games and apps in building peace and fostering positive relations between communities 
and between communities and institutions (Kahl 2014). This approach points to the 
recognition that the use of ICTs can considerably enhance hybrid forms of peace as 
conceptualised in recent literature (Mac Ginty 2010; Richmond 2011). They can do so by 
fomenting local access to formal peacebuilding practice(s) and thus challenge existing power 
biases of institutions. In that sense, ICTs can serve as platforms of resistance for actors that 
had previously been excluded from formal politics. This is evident in the case of Cyprus, 
where NGOs and the bi-communal peace formation movements have been quite isolated 
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since the 1990s (Richmond 2012: 23) from the general public (physically, ideologically, and 
in terms of their approaches to the transformation of the conflict). Initiatives such as the 
Cyprus Community Media Centre (CCMC, http://www.cypruscommunitymedia.org) have led 
to a rise in media coverage of civil society organisations on the island active in the promotion 
of bi-communal dialogue (ibid.). The CCMC has been providing training for other civil 
society organisations on the island to improve their communication channels with the wider 
public – which, amongst others, helps to deal with the perceived gap between civil society 
organisations and wider society on the island.   
At the same time, movements like the ‘Occupy the buffer zone’ (OBZ, 
http://occupythebufferzone.wordpress.com/) and Mahallae (https://mahallae.org) have 
manifested the potential of ICTs for the emergence of grassroots activism and their outreach 
into both communities, leading to proactive civic engagement. With regards to the latter, 
Hands-on Famagusta is another interesting project initiated by architects, whose aim is to 
facilitate a participatory process for Cypriots to re-imagine and re-design a unified post-
conflict Famagusta with shared and effective infrastructure and services (Stratis and Akbil 
2015). All these platforms and initiatives use new social media (blogs, Facebook, Twitter) to 
organise and disseminate their activities, and to mobilise people from both sides of the island 
through new social media.   
In the case of OBZ, the movement successfully used social media to build a bi-
communal movement intent on reclaiming the buffer zone as ‘their space’. On a couple of 
occasions their intentions landed them into trouble with local and international authorities. In 
2012, and after several attempts by the European Union and the UNDP to remove a group 
pertaining to the movement from a building they were occupying, the Greek Cypriot police 
intervened with potentially fabricated stories of drug-trafficking and other criminal activities 
(Confidential source, 2012; Confidential source, 2014)  On a separate and subsequent 
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incident a few months later, OBZ’s initiative to stage a game of volleyball (i.e., non-violent 
protest) in order to ridicule the slow pace of the peace process incurred an angry and violent 
response from UN peacekeepers, with the UN spokesperson Michel Bonnardeaux claiming 
that ‘the area is not a public area, it’s narrow and meant to be a crossing point, not meant to 
be a place for an event. We’re happy to host events but they have to ask permission’ (OBZ 
2013).  One would think that bottom-up, participatory and inclusive approaches to peace 
would be welcomed by an organisation such as the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus 
(UNFICYP). Instead, this hegemonic insistence to obey the rules seems to contradict the 
organisation’s narrative for a locally-owned peace, as well as its concern at the unwillingness 
and non-commitment of the parties involved to resolve the conflict (UN 2010). What is more, 
it may well be a missed opportunity, as such local attempts of peacebuilding have shown the 
ability to include ICTs in ways that foment mobilisation and social activism for peace.   
In South Africa too, as mentioned briefly above, ICTs are being used by university 
researchers, citizen initiatives and NGOs alike to formulate and promote policy alternatives. 
A project run by the University of Western Cape is using digital storytelling in order to frame 
experiences of traumatised individuals, whose voices are not heard in the politically-
controlled or excessively market-oriented mainstream media (Confidential source 2012). The 
shack dwellers' movement Abahlali baseMjondolo, (www.abahlali.org) is using ICTs in order 
to include youth and thus facilitate bottom-up approaches (Poni 2012) in its fight for the right 
to housing and against the criminalisation of poverty by an increasingly politicised police 
force (OpenDemocracy 2013). In a similar vein, the Human Rights Media Centre 
(www.hrmc.org.za) uses its media skills to fight for political and material rights of 
marginalised communities and, as the director suggested, managed to shift ‘boundaries of 
discrimination’ (Gunn 2012).  
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Signs of empowerment and resistance through civic media and citizen journalism are 
also evident in Sri Lanka, which is perhaps the case with the most stifling political 
environment. An early example was Infoshare (www.infoshare.lk), whose work focused in 
fostering democratic practices and good governance as pillars of positive social change. This 
was done by facilitating the strengthening of civic participation and citizen engagement in 
human rights issues, election and corruption monitoring (Hattotuwa 2007). Following the 
demise of the ceasefire agreement, the onset of war and the change of government, Infoshare 
has moved away from its peacebuilding orientation (Hattotuwa 2013). Groundviews 
(www.groundviews.org) is another medium that seeks to transform ages-long attitudes, 
behaviours and narratives of the conflict through a number of initiatives. While serving 
primarily as a citizen journalism platform, uncovering state security forces abuses and 
discrimination tactics and policies, Groundviews also includes initiatives like ‘Mediated’ 
(Hattotuwa 2012) – an art exhibition that sought to communicate constitutional matters, 
socioeconomic data and religious identity writing by challenging public apathy and engaging 
critical engagement – and ‘30 years ago’ (www.30yearsago.asia) – a group of film-makers, 
photographers, activists, theorists, and others that Groundviews  brought together in order to 
highlight how the 1983 anti-Tamil pogrom has shaped Sri Lankan life, social mentality and 
perceptions, and even polity.  
It is evident from the above that ICTs can represent a platform which is accessible to a 
broad range of groups and actors and can therefore empower a variety of grassroots actors. 
Given that access to ICTs requires not only the necessary infrastructure, but in some cases 
also technical skills, the support of such practice through peacebuilding actors and donors can 
boost the ways in which ICTs can represent channels through which otherwise disguised 
agendas can be made explicit. 
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However, it is crucial to remember that such usage of ICTs does not necessarily iron 
out power imbalances, but can instead further cement dividing lines in society, at grassroots 
level. This is particularly the case in situations where certain local actors have strategies to 
better access ICTs and international support in this context, while others remain at the 
sidelines of such practices, either through a reluctance to engage with ICTs, or alternatively a 
lack of infrastructure or funding. The implications of this are that ICTs should not per se be 
considered as agents of social change (Welch et al 2015) in general, and peacebuilding in 
particular. Instead, as posited by our framework, ICTs have to be viewed in a continuous 
tension between disempowerment, marginalisation and empowerment, and activated in 
different ways by the agents controlling and using them.  
  
 
Conclusion 
 
The point of departure for this paper was the lack of research of the role of ICTs in post-
conflict peacebuilding, especially when compared to related research on their role in 
terrorism, propaganda, but also development, democratisation and natural disasters. In many 
ways, the findings are similar to the findings in relation to the role of ICTs in development or 
democratisation, in that they allow for a participatory element in such processes, while not 
guaranteeing the latter as and in of themselves. However, we recognise a particularly 
complex angle in the relationship between ICTs and peace/conflict, in that ICTs can redefine 
social relationships, both for the promotion of hegemony and empowerment of local 
organisations alike. This perhaps suggests that ICTs have, in the field of peacebuilding, a 
lesser determining role than commonly expected – they represent but a tool which needs to be 
activated and used by those capable of and willing to use it.  
 22 
 
The research presented in this article is not exhaustive of the nature of ICTs, nor 
indeed of all issues raised by their use. For one, many studies on the role of ICTs in 
peacebuilding (including this one) tend to underexplore methodological and epistemological 
obstacles. For instance, addressing the grassroots movements as one, coherent and uniform 
body throughout any geography is bound to lead to problematic findings. This is particularly 
evident in our attempt to browse through a number of different post-conflict contexts, all of 
which shape the functions and effects of ICTs in their own, very specific way, and where 
different (grassroots) actors have used ICTs in different forms. Similarly with legitimacy, 
which, unlike a binary concept that one either has or has not, it is constantly evolving and 
contested (Newton 2013). Finally, a more solid discussion of power-relations with regards to 
use of ICTs in peacebuilding should uncover in a more nuanced manner the gender and 
generational imbalances that are simultaneously evident in peacebuilding praxis. Although 
we have not unpacked such questions in this article in detail, we want to encourage that 
future research focus not only on the mechanisms of potential inclusion that ICTs can bring, 
but also dynamics of exclusion and division.   
In this context, we realise that for every identified role the ICTs can have, there are 
corresponding risks. A hegemonic, legitimation-seeking regime will attempt full control of 
ICTs, thus reinforcing top-down policies that will more likely reflect a victor’s peace (as in 
the cases of Sri Lanka and Turkey). A more neutral stance like the one usually exhibited by 
international actors in post-conflict environments, whereby ICTs are neglected to the expense 
of aggrieved groups and communities, runs the risk of being similarly exclusionary. Finally, 
even when the international community jumps on the virtual wagon and exhibits total support 
of virtual peacebuilding initiatives, the risk that local power imbalances will be perpetuated 
or reinforced remains, as evidenced in the case of South Africa.  
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 This latter, however, is not much different from traditional, non-virtual peacebuilding 
approaches practiced until now. This, as the literature that is critical of hybrid peacebuilding 
informs, may be because the risks identified above are inherent in the praxis of peacebuilding 
itself, transforming ICTs into a platform on which the politics of peace is played out. As a 
clearly political activity, peacebuilding includes and consists of power dynamics, and its 
objective is to transform power antagonisms into synergies. ICTs have the potential to serve 
as mediators, transforming hegemonic input into resistive practices, while at the same time 
also implying the risk of promoting hegemonic practices in new channels. In the context of 
peacebuilding, this seems to be particularly problematic, given that the authority to build 
peace is usually not democratically given, but tends to derive its legitimacy from global top-
down structures.  
The representation of resistance and the grassroots mobilisation towards more 
inclusionary peace frameworks, we believe, is where ICTs can play a significant role in 
altering liberal peacebuilding’s input and transforming it through a decentralisation of power, 
as is evident to a certain, albeit limited, extent in the Cypriot, Bosnian and Sri Lankan civic 
efforts. The transformation of conflict attitudes, behaviours and objectives to post-conflict 
sustainable, and self-sustained mentalities of acceptance and coexistence can only emerge by 
the everyday and the local that form part of the socioeconomic and socio-political fabric 
where these attitudes and behaviours are present. This is precisely the point where excluded 
actors can be empowered vis-à-vis an often dominant infrastructure of international 
peacebuilding, and also where the role of the international community should carefully throw 
its weight and focus, mindful of the risks associated with the wider social power structures 
inherent in the use of ICTs.    
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Notes 
                                                          
1
 On the impact of lack of infrastructure on the use of ICTs see Leetaru et al (2013) 
2
 While this is an important observation to make with regards to the use of ICTs and the power relations they 
foster, we believe it could be more extensively researched in its own merit. 
3
 For a more detailed overview over this, see Norris (2001). 
4
 Many thanks to Marianne Perez de Fransius for highlighting this point 
5
 “[O]ff-the-shelf and made according to a generalised template rather than according to local conditions”. (Mac 
Ginty, 2008: 145). 
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